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Eixos Temático: Agroenergia: Conflitos e Alternativas no Campo 
Abstract: This paper presents the reconfiguration of state, corporate and labour relations that 
follow from the increased international investment by RLOFRPSDQLHVLQ%UD]LO¶s (bio)ethanol 
sector. It emphasises how new path-dependent technological and institutional arrangements, 
conceptualised as a µtechno-institutional fix¶, interrelate with broader systemic power 
relations and spatial strategies of accumulation (the spatial fix). These overlap to ensure 
competitive advantage of agroenergy leaders and increasingly concentrate land, wealth and 
power in the region of focus, albeit through accumulation strategies that postpone crises rather 
than resolve inherent instability.  Testimonies from landless workers, rural and industrial 
workers in the fields and factories of biofuel cultivation and distillation counter the 
institutional discourse linking rural and sustainable development to these new energy 
extractions. The relatively fi[HG JHRJUDSKLFDO QDWXUH RI WKHVH ZRUNHUV¶ collective 
organisations, however, is a marked contrast to the increasing flexibility and scales of 
operation of the leading multinational corporations and limits their capacity to resist 
prevailing relations.  5HVXOWLQJ SRZHU DV\PPHWULHV RU µSRZHU JHRPHWULHV¶ XQGHUVFRUH WKH
reproduction of inequality, labour exclusion and dispossession in the new frontiers of 
agroenergy production.  Key words: biofuel, innovation, power, conflict 
Resumo: Este artigo apresenta a reconfiguração das relações entre Estado, corporações e de 
trabalho que seguem o aumento de investimento internacional por companhias de petróleo no 
VHWRUEUDVLOHLURGHHWDQRO2 WUDEDOKRVHFRQFHQWUDHPFRPRQRYDV µWUDMHWyULDVGHSHQGHQWHV¶
(path depenGHQW DUUDQMRV WHFQROyJLFRV H LQVWLWXFLRQDLV FRQFHSWXDOL]DGRV FRPR ³DUUDQMR
tecno-LQVWLWXFLRQDO´ VH LQWHU-relacionam com mais amplas relações de poder sistemáticas e 
estratégias espaciais de acumulação (arranjo espacial). Essa sobreposição se faz para 
assegurar vantagem competitiva de líderes agro-energéticos e emergente concentração de 
terra, riqueza e poder na região de enfoque, ainda que por meio de estratégias de acumulação 
que postergam crises ao invés de resolver a instabilidade inerente. Depoimentos de 
trabalhadores sem terra, rurais e operários nos campos e fábricas de cultivo de 
biocombustíveis e destilação contradiz com o discurso institucional vinculando o 
desenvolvimento rural e sustentável para estas novas extrações de energia. A natureza 
geográfica relativamente fixa de organizações coletivas destes trabalhadores, porém, é 
marcada pelo contraste no aumento da flexibilidade e escalas de operação das principais 
empresas multinacionais e sua limitada capacidade de resistir às relações predominantes. 
5HVXOWDQGR HP DVVLPHWULDV GR SRGHU RX ³JHRPHWULDV GR SRGHU´ UHVVDOWDP D UHSURGXomR GD
desigualdade, da exclusão do trabalho e desapropriação nas novas fronteiras da produção 
agroenergetica.  Palavras-chave: Biocombustível, inovação, poder, conflito 
Introduction 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, growing policy concerns regarding issues of 
resource security (energy, food, water, minerals) are accompanied by further changing 
relations between states and (global) markets and corporations. This has profound 
implications for natural resource utilisation and for livelihoods in key regions of production, 
while unsustainable consumption rates in urban centres continue largely unchecked.  State 
development strategies linked to a neo-extractivism accompany rising geopolitical and 
economic power amongst large, populous and rapidly changing nation-states and reflect 
market diversification by leading energy companies.  New models of state-capital relations in 
Brazil, China and in several Latin American countries are also, thereby, gaining greater 
influence over global political economic trends and norms.   This is true also in the pivotal 
socio-economic arena of technological µLQQRYDWLRQ¶ seen as the key both to resolving the 
current challenges (of economic growth, climate change, resource security) and to the 
continuation of national development projects.   
Concerned that further economic growth (or socioeconomic development more 
broadly) does not simply exacerbate the other problems, such as pollution and climate change, 
there is a new transnational HPSKDVLVXSRQµJUHHQ¶LQQRYDWLRQEHLQJµUHVSRQVLEOH¶LQYDJXHO\
specified ways: providing development and decent work in rural areas (EC, 2009; ILO and 
UNEP, 2012), protecting the environment and upgrading marginalised land.  This is evident 
in institutional discourses promoting the emerging global commodity chain for ethanol as a 
substitute for fossil fuel, whether these belong to state governments or global organisations 
promoting business (OECD), trade (WTO) development (World Bank)  the environment and 
jobs (ILO and UNEP 2012; see FRANCO et al., 2010).    
In Brazil, however, home to arguably WKH ZRUOG¶V PRVW LPSUHVVLYH WHUULWRULDO DQG
technological advances in bioethanol production, instabilities within the liberal market 
IRXQGDWLRQVXSRQZKLFKWKHµJUHHQ¶HFRQRP\LVEHLQJEXLOWUDLVHLPSRUWDQWTXHVWions over the 
social impacts and the future sustainability of liquid biofuels. However, amidst recent and 
projected factory closures, soil and water conservation concerns and enduring protests over 
access to land and food, technological progress -in the form of advanced or second generation 
biofuels -has again been prioritised as a solution to economic, environmental and social 
critiques.   
 
Objectives 
It is against this backdrop that this paper seeks to consider the contemporary reconfiguration 
of the social and spatial relations between the state, corporations and labour in a region of 
agroenergy industrial expansion linked to emerging international markets. Specifically it will 
investigate: a) how does state and corporate promotion of agroenergy, within incumbent 
paradigms of massive liquid fuel consumption and market financialisation, increasingly 
concentrate power in the innovation and application of new technologies? (b)  how does this 
technological and institutional convergence relate to, and manifest itself in, territorial and 
organisational restructuring of leading transnational energy companies and in their relation 
with labour? F ZKDW DUH WKH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI SRZHU DV\PPHWULHV RU µpower geomHWULHV¶
between leading firms operating across regional and national frontiers and the relatively 
sedentary or fragmented character if the collective organisations of rural labourers and 
landless workers? 
 
Rationale, overview and methodology 
The paper is the outcome of an interdisciplinary collaboration between scientists from Brazil 
and UK investigating VRFLDOO\DQGHQYLURQPHQWDOO\FRPPLWWHGRUµUHVSRQVLEOH¶WHFKQRORJLFDO
development and application.  We contend that there is an urgent need to envision, innovate 
and pursue alternatives to contemporary forms of (bio)energy and mineral extraction and 
consumption that do not hinge on land dispossession, the overexploitation of natural resources 
and human labour to support unsustainable and unequal modes of living and transport in 
swelling urban centres.  The retention, indeed promotion of automobile culture in new, path 
GHSHQGHQW ELRIXHO WHFKQRORJLFDO GHYHORSPHQWV WKDW DUH SURPRWHG DV µJUHHQHU¶ LV RQH VXFK
example RI µROG ZLQH¶ EHLQJ SRXUHG LQWR µQHZ ERWWOHV¶.   The incorporation of work and 
employment issues into formal climate agreements at the Rio+20 UN Conference reflected 
growing acceptance of broader social implications of climate change and, albeit muted, 
acknowledgement of labour exploitation in mineral and energy extraction and cultivation.  
SWDWH FDSLWDO DQG ODERXU UHODWLRQV LQ %UD]LO¶V DJURHQergy sector, and consequent agrarian 
conflicts, have received attention in geographic literature (e.g. THOMAZ Jr, 2002). The 
present agroindustrial restructuring has not, we would argue, been adequately linked to 
specific and dynamic technological and institutional arrangements of leading oil majors most 
responsible for these changes. Furthermore, the link between these strategic and operational 
arrangements, the broader economic system within which they are embedded and the role of 
innovation and spatial expansion in overcoming profit accumulation crises and labour 
conflicts remain under analysed.  
We begin the paper with an overview of the methodology for fieldwork undertaken in 
the bioethanol sector between 2012 and 2014 in western Sao Paulo state.  We then outline the 
two key theoretical underpinnings for WKLVSDSHUQDPHO\WKHµWHFKQR-institutional fix¶ and the 
µVSDWLDO IL[¶ :HKLJKOLJKW WKHFRPPRQDOLW\EHWZHHQ WKHVHGLVWLQFWFRQFHSWV and emphasise 
how in both cases a closer examination of constituent power relations improves upon existing 
analytical frameworks.  Indeed a third concept, that of power geometries, provides a link 
between these in order to better understand and characterise the shifting social relations and 
conflicts in the bioethanol sector that are the focus of the next section of the paper.  State and 
corporate policy and strategy are outlined, with particular reference to oil giant Shell and its 
merger with Brazilian company, Cosan. Its localised regional restructuring is linked to 
financial markets and globalising networks of energy consumption with which these new 
spaces are embedded. This is followed by the testimonies of landless workers occupying 
territory in the region of study, agricultural, industrial workers and their trade unions within 
the commodity chain.  These accounts form the basis of the discussion on asymmetrical 
power relations in these regions of production that provide significant challenges to rural 
workers and their collective organisations. 
Field work was carried out Pontal de Paranapenema and Mid Paranapanema, in the 
west of Sao Paulo, in the Central South region of Brazil. Over a period of 18 months, one-to-
one interviews and focus group interviews were conducted with managers, industrial 
consultants, manual sugar cane cutters and mechanics, machine operators, laboratory and 
auxiliary staff in four ethanol distilleries. Focus groups with former cane cutters and 
participant observations were also carried out at one occupation and one settlement of the 
Brazil Landless Workers Movement.  This primary material was complemented with an 
overview of policy and investment strategies of the Brazilian state, EU, corporate bodies, 
producer associations and international organisations.  
 
Theoretical framework 
The techno-institutional lock in 
1RUPDWLYH OLWHUDWXUH RQ WKH UHTXLUHG µWUDQVLWLRQ¶ IURP KLJK FDUERQ SDWK-dependent energy 
systems to a lower carbon economic infrastructure commonly assumes an expert-led, elite 
process from one technological system to another, within or across benign states.  In his 
FRQFHSWRQWKHµWHFKQR-institutional lock-LQ¶8QUXK) highlighted that system dominance 
of a particular technological system may continue, not necessarily as a result of superior 
product design, utility or quality, but by its ability to lower economic, social and 
SV\FKRORJLFDOFRVWVRIUHODWLYHWRSRWHQWLDOFRPSHWLWRUVZKRDUHµORFNHG-RXW¶)OXON, 2002). 
Path dependencies, positive feedback and asymmetries of power meant dominant systems are 
resistant to change.  These characteristics and potential for inertia they share with institutions, 
WKH IRUPDO RU LQIRUPDO FRQVWUDLQWV µWKDW KXPDQ EHLQJV GHYLVH WR VKDSH KXPDQ LQWHUDFWLRQ¶
(FOXON, 2002). Indeed as a result of economies of scale, learned behaviours, established 
networks and infrastructures co-evolving interaction between these systems and political 
LQVWLWXWLRQVFXOPLQDWHV LQD µWHFKQR-LQVWLWXWLRQDOFRPSOH[¶ 8NRUH, 2002).  The fossil fuel 
EDVLV IRU LQGXVWULDO HFRQRPLHV¶ HQHUJ\ DQG WUDQVSRUW V\VWHPV LV RQHRI FOHDUHVW H[DPSOHVRI
techno-institutional lock-in. The relentless pursuit of new sources of oil and gas (e.g. tar 
sands, deep water, shale rock) to support unsustainable infrastructures continues in the face of 
known consequences (externalities) for the environment, for immediate and future social 
wellbeing.  Concerns with the exhaustion of conventional oil deposits, political volatility in 
key oil producing regions and modest post-Kyoto mandates for reducing carbon emissions 
have, however, have coerced governments and oil companies to consider alternatives sources 
and technologies for energy security.  Unruh explained that when environmental externalities 
such as climate change arise from locked in systems, such as fossil fuel combustion, favoured 
solutions are those that minimise change to the existing system by treating emissions (indeed 
75% of pollution control investment in major industrial countries is from treating emissions) 
or making incremental, intra-V\VWHPLQQRYDWLRQVWKDWVHHNµWRPDLQWDLQas much similarity as 
possible between the existing system anG WKHQHZFRQILJXUDWLRQ¶ Unruh, 2002: 318).  This 
can be observed in the transition to bioenergy. Among the many possible sources of lower 
FDUERQ µUHQHZDEOH¶ HQHUJ\ OLTXLG ELRIXHOV KDYH EHHQ WKH IRFXV RI VXFFHVVIXO OREELHV E\
automobile, energy, agriculture and biotechnology corporations who have found suitable 
partners at the levels national and transnational governance (FRANCO et al., 2010). Transport 
infrastructures and growth patterns are left largely untouched by the substitution of a 
percentage of conventional hydrocarbon fuels with liquid biofuels to meet lower carbon 
requirements. 
Towards a techno-institutional fix 
The particular conception of this techno-institutional complex, while acknowledging that 
history matters, however, is provided in highly structural manner, with little concept of how 
transitions are mediated in and by power relations. This sets up a falsely bifurcating 
FRQFHSWXDO IUDPHZRUN LQZKLFK WKH µH[LVWLQJ¶V\VWHP LV µORFNHG-LQ¶DQG µEDG¶ KLJK-carbon, 
irresponsible, exploitatLYHDQGUHVLVWDQWWRFKDQJHZKLOHFKDQJHLVZLOIXOO\FRQVLGHUHGµJRRG¶
(a low-FDUERQ UHVSRQVLEOH µZLQ-ZLQ¶) and presented as a discontinuity or rupture to the 
prevailing complex.  A purely institutional analysis of how, for example, innovation and 
application of technology reflects the aspirations of relatively powerful actors, precludes a 
deeper understanding of the (often unstable) interaction between these actors and the political 
economy within which their innovations are embedded and in which they seek to maintain 
competitive advantage. Rather than present a rupture to the fossil-fuel based technological 
system, the Brazilian state and oil corporations promote the merits of least disruptive 
µUHQHZDEOH¶biofuels on the world stage, while simultaneously and relentlessly pursuing new 
sources of fossil fuels, hence diversifying their sources and markets,  
Jessop  XWLOLVHG WKH WHUP µLnstitutional fix¶ in order to capture these systemic 
linkages and to describe the ability of complementary institutions to provide favourable 
conditions to (temporarily) escape episodic crises, ensure capital accumulation, maintain 
social order, dilute risk and defer other destabilising forces.  In doing so he highlighted the 
instability and compromise involved in this strategic coupling between state and private sector 
interests and pointed to the constitutive power and class relations within emerging 
technological systems.   
 
Techo-institutional and spatial fixes                                                                                                                      
In recognising the requirement and ability of capital to divert and postpone crises over time 
and space in order to restore profit margins, Jessop links the institutional fix to the spatial fix 
(HARVEY, 2001) or spatiotemporal fix (see JESSOP, 2014 for discussion).  Schumpeter 
(1994) XWLOLVHGWKHWHUPµFUHDWLYHGHVWUXFWLRQ¶WRKLJKOLJKWKRZFDSLWDODYHUWVFULVLVLQWKHVKRUW
term through innovations that render previous capital value and labour useless over time and 
restore competitiveness.  Harvey (1989: 105-6) emphasised how capital shifts its internal 
contradictions around in space, redistributing risk geographically while compressing the time 
taken to extract, process and transport its products. Hence globalisation was characterised by 
µWLPH-VSDFH FRPSUHVVLRQ¶. In coining the phrase, the µVSDWLDO IL[¶ KH GHVFULEHG how capital 
must construct and control new spaces in order to function; however, over time these too are 
unable to return an adequate rate of profit and so capital relentlessly seeks new spaces for 
expansion, destroying tKHSUHYLRXVO\µIL[HG¶VSDFHLQFOXGLQJFDSLWDODVVHWVDQGODERXUIRULWV
functioning (HARVEY, 2001a, p. 307; 2001b, p. 24-25). Harvey outlines four key strategies 
in which capital postpones these episodic crises:1) new external markets are created across 
geographic space ; 2) time is µERXJKW¶ by investing surplus capital in long-term projects such 
as training, infrastructure, research and communication that overcome spatial barriers and 
generate profits in the future; 3) by improving existing machinery, technology and creating 
new production facilities, and 4) expanding the population available to work through the 
separation of workers from the means of production (ibid, 2001a, p. 304-6).                                                                    
 In prioritising the QHROLEHUDO VWDWH¶V UROH LQ SURYLGLQJ WKH FRQGLWLRQV IDYRXUDEOH IRU
capital accumulation and emphasising new forms of territoriality by market forces, Harvey 
too has faced charges of reductionism, side-lining constituent elements of the capital 
productive process, labour in particular (see HARTSTOCK, 2006 for discussion). As Herod 
argues (2001) just as workers make their own histories, though not necessarily under 
conditions of their own making so too do they make their own spaces, while similarly 
constrained.   Social mobilisations by rural poor and indigenous have been to the fore of 
resistance to mineral extraction and biofuel monoculture, underscoring their negative social 
and environmental externalities. In doing so they have not only exercised their own forms of 
territoriality but, alongside feminist critiques, have engendered an epistemological challenge 
to western-biased, patriarchal discourses of modernity and historic, technical-scientific and 
economic determinism (PORTO-GONCALVES, 2006).  Furthermore, economic clustering in 
countries such as China and Brazil have led to many examples of industrial strengthening 
(SILVER, 2003) as workers and their unions recognise the geographical scale of their 
activities and that they form part of broader production networks that are affected by their 
local actions. /DERXU¶V FDSDFLW\ WR GLVUXSW WKH SURGXFWLRQ SURFHVV LQ SXUVXLW RI LPSURYed 
wages and conditions is something capital must continue to contend with (WRIGHT 2000) 
DQG ODERXU¶V FRQVWLWXWLYH UROH LQFRPPRGLW\ FKDLQV LV LQFUHDVLQJO\ UHFRJQLVHG 7AYLOR et 
al., 2013). Marx recognised that while competition for surplus profit was a powerful incentive 
IRU HQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS DQG WHFKQRORJLFDO SURJUHVV VR WRRZDV FDSLWDO¶V FRQVHTXHQWQHHG WR UH
assert control over the labour process, which it seeks to do using a mixture of hard and soft 
technologies (MANDEL, 1980).   
 
Power, space and power geometries 
An analytical framework that is concerned with power inequalities in incumbent and 
emerging energy infrastructures and systems must account for these above contestations.   
Capital may seek to homogenise processes across distinct regions (MOL,2007) and µcarbon 
counting¶ is certainly another way in which diverse resources are removed from their specific 
and geographic, cultural and political context and commodified (LEVIDOW, 2013). But the 
ground over which capital must travel is rougher than JOREDOLVDWLRQ¶V crowing metaphor of 
fluidity would suggest (SANTOS, 1978). Thus Massey (1994) asks, µis space really 
annihilated by time?   There are, she argues, µWKHJURXSVZKRDUHUHDOO\LQDVHQVHin charge of 
time-space compression¶« µwho can really use it and turn it to advantage, whose power and 
LQIOXHQFHLWYHU\GHILQLWHO\LQFUHDVHV¶ (italics added).  There are also, however, µgroups who 
are also doing a lot of physical moving (migrant labour, poor farmers), but who are not 'in 
charge' of the process¶.  Indeed the increasing influence and mobility of the former group 
depends on the acquiescence, restriction or invisibility of the latter. Hence power is relational 
and these µpower geometries¶, the ways in which people are differentially located within 
'time-space compression', are complex and varied.  The globalization of social relations may 
bring new encounters and increase the mobility of some, yet LW LVDW WKHVDPHWLPHµanother 
source of (the reproduction of) geographical uneven development¶, and reproduces the 
specific character of particular places.   As Porto-Goncalves points out (2006), the logistical 
and technological advances that overcome spatial barriers and poor soils, reduce transport 
times and bring new resources into production bring agroenergy companies into conflict once 
again with the µsubaltern¶; those indigenous and rural communities that have sought to 
exercise influence over previously remote places.  The resistance by these groups has 
demonstrated that, while time is the dimension of succession and change, space requires the 
dimension of temporality and of contemporaneous multiplicity (MASSEY, 1994; PORTO 
GONCALVES, 2006). Space is constantly in the process of being made, unmade or remade, 
through the establishment or refusal of relations (MASSEY, 2009). IW LV ZKHUH µVRPH
processes adapt themselves to pre-existing forms, while others create new forms that are 
LQVHUWHG¶6DQWRV.    
 We turn now to the new spaces of agroenergy production to consider how techno-
institutional and spatial fixes overlap to strengthen the µJURXSV LQ FKDUJH¶ RI energy 
restructuring in Brazil, unpack how this overlap is reflected in µQHZIRUPV¶RIKDUGDQGVRft 
innovation and uncover the implications for and responses by workers within and without of 
the emerging commodity chains for bioethanol. 
 
State, Capital and a new techno-institutional and spatial fix for bioenergy 
Kyoto Protocol and the European Union 
With as much as a 70% lower carbon output at point of combustion, conducive to blending 
with petroleum and now costing around 50 euros to convert an engine to run on either petrol 
or ethanol, consumption levels, biofuel from tropical sugar cane is a world leading biofuel , 
(FRANCO et al., 2010; OBERLING et al. 2012).   A 20% growth in biofuels, 2004-2009, was 
dominated by bioethanol, and projections estimate that that it may constitute 7% of global 
road transport fuel by 2020 and 11% by 2030 (at present 98% of road transport in EU is 
fuelled by hydrocarbons; IEA, 2011).   In the face of uncertainty relating to the longer term 
economic prospects of bioenergy supply chains, food security, actual savings to carbon, 
environmental sustainability and certification performance (e.g. SEARCHINGER et al., 
2008,), the European Commission support for the biofuel strategy reflected strong political 
interests (DI LUCIA el al., 2012) and the EU was accused of selective and policy based 
evidence gathering by its own institutions (LEVIDOW, 2014).   Campaigns by small farmers 
in rural areas; for example Mozambique and Brazil, the very subjects that were to benefit 
from energy cultivation (ILO and UNEP, 2012), spearheaded concerns over food security and 
indirect land use changes that the EC has been forced to consider.  Rather than address 
systemic power, land and income inequalities in this evolving techno-institutional complex 
for biofuels (to which we will turn), authorities in EU have tread a cautious path between 
supporting incumbent (first generation) biofuel production and consumption and proposing 
WKDWLWLVUHSODFHGLQWKHDIIRUGDEOHIXWXUHE\PRUHDGYDQFHGµVHFRQG¶JHQHUDWLRQELRIXHOVWKDW
can be sourced from any lignocellulosic matter and adjudged to be less harmful (see PIETRO 
and LEVIDOW, 2014). The EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED) of 2009 set a binding 
target of 10% renewable energy in transport by 2020 and subsequently introduced a 5% cap 
on biofuels made from food crops when determining progress toward the 2020 target.  
It is evident, however, that 27 EU members state committed to the Kyoto reductions 
have neither the land, climate nor technology to meet existing targets. In its turn to Brazil for 
biofuel import WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V (& LQLWLDO IRFXV RQ WKH QHHG WR GHFDUERQLVH
automobility (CEC 2010: 2) has morphed to emphasising the social and economic value 
added by a new trade in bioenergy:  
When favouring the development of the market for renewable energy sources, it is 
necessary to take into account the positive impact on regional and local development 
opportunities, export prospects, social cohesion and employment opportunities, in 
particular as concerns SMEs and independeQWHQHUJ\SURGXFHUV¶(&) 
Rural development, reduced rural-urban migration, growing schemes for small land holders 
have been among the forecast benefits (see FRANCO et al., 2010; LEVIDOW, 2014) that 
KDYHVLPLODUO\EHHQOLQNHGWRWKHµ'HFHQWZRUN¶DJHQGDRIWKH,/2LQZKLFKLPSURYHd wages, 
work quality and conditions might result from economic upgrading. 
 
%UD]LO¶VQHZHQHUJ\QDWLRQDOLVPDQGinternationalisation of Brazilian biofuel 
In the wake of the Kyoto protocol the state promotion of ethanol as a component of energy 
security and economic growth was given renewed environmental credibility.   In the year of 
his 2003 election President Lula da Silva embraced both the large internal market and a key 
technological innovation by which Brazilian-designed fuel sensor software allowed for the 
more affordable monitoring and handling of ethanol-gasoline blends in automobile engines.  
The state promotion of the production and cRQVXPSWLRQRI µIOH[L-IXHO¶YHKLcles (FFVs) that 
could run on petrol or ethanol was a success and now 88% of sales of light-duty vehicles 
(LDVs) in Brazil.  The market built upon the strong command of the commodity chain during 
the discontinued PROALCOOL programme and re-energised the ethanol industry. Ethanol 
has been supported continuously by government intervention (by increasing the percentage of 
ethanol in the fuel mix) each time the price relationship with petrol has been unfavourable to 
ethanol. By 2020, FFVs are predicted to account for more than 70% of a stock of almost 40 
million LDVs. 
Following a visit by George W Bush in 2007 WRGLVFXVVELRIXHOV/XOD¶Vdetermination to 
lead in the sector and find markets further afield was evident, ³everyone is eyeing the 
alcohol«ZHZDQWWRZLQWKHIRUHLJQPDUNHW´His enthusiasm for the internationalisation of 
bioenergy was FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK KLV JRYHUQPHQW¶V GLVWLQFW HFRQRPLF VZHUYH EDFN WRZDUGV
primary commodity production and export.  Following 1995 membership of the World Trade 
Organisation, a 1998 amendment to the constitution forbade discrimination against foreign 
capital investment in Brazilian industry.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the primary 
sector leapt from US$ 2.4 billion in 2000 to US$ 13.1 billion in 2007, with mining, soya, 
sugar and cattle raising activities particularly prominent (PRETTO, 2009). The FDI in alcohol 
and biofuels increased from 4 million dollars in 2002 to 1.64 billion dollars in 2008. In the 
2007-2008 sugar harvest only 7% of the mills had the participation of external capital. In the 
wake of the financial crisis of 2008 this percentage more than tripled to 22% by 2010-2011 
(Beatriz, 2011) 
Transnational companies arrived to cash in on a staggering $28.2 billion credit line (2000-
2010; by comparison the state planned PROALCOOL programme cost $7 billion), and found 
Brazil with its natural endowments, strong command of the production chain and favourable 
market projections for bioenergy a keen place for investment, particularly given financial 
instability in North American and European banking institutions. Noble (China), Abengoa 
(Spain), Cargill, ADM, Bunge (USA), Louis Dreyfus, Tereos (France), Shell (Holland-UK), 
BP (UK) and Mitsubishi and Sojitz (Japan) were among the investors while Brazilian oil and 
construction giants, Petrobras and Odebrecht also entered the biofuel sector.  Credit was 
commanded by firms located in Sao Paulo and surrounding states whose new organizational 
strategies and competencies dominated the regional frontiers of sugar cane. The land devoted 
to sugar cane doubled, increased the production of sugar from 258 to 625 million tonnes and 
ethanol from 11 billion to 28 billion litres between 2000 and 2011.  In the face of enhanced 
competition over one hundred mergers with, or acquisitions of, smaller Brazilian firms took 
place between 2000 and 2011.   
 As with many successful corporations involved global commodity trade, 
diversification of production is key to gaining and retaining competitiveness.  The main 
objecWLYH RI PRGHUQ µELRUHILQHULHV¶ is to produce multiple products using a combination of 
technologies. The ability to switch between sugar and ethanol production according to market 
price and demand, to produce energy by burning bagasse (the residue of the sugar cane plant) 
and produce a variety of sugars, hydrous and anhydrous ethanol are typical of the modern 
plants which boast a range of ISO quality certificates for national and international markets.  
Increasing land and capital costs are providing new barriers to entry into the sector and, it 
would appear, that only those corporations with access to international finance to nourish the 
required territorial expansion while continuing to invest in technological advances are able to 
remain competitive.  This has been even more apparent following the 2008 financial crisis 
(MENDONÇA et al. 2013).  With the subsequent squeeze on government-backed credit 
multinational companies have grown at the expense of those with more limited scales of 
operation.  Thus, fifty-one companies have ceased operations since 2007, with 30 of these 
folding in just two years (2011 and 2012).  By 2012 these closures had extinguished an 
estimated 13 000 direct and 32 000 indirect jobs (Folha de S. Paulo 2012).  
 
Secondary, or advanced, biofuel technologies 
Despite government provision of a further R$1 billion to stimulate research and development 
of secondary or advanced biofuels, the large internal market which until recently has absorbed 
almost all nationally produced ethanol (there was in fact a deficit in 2009) and prohibitive 
start-up costs may explain why many Brazilian firms have resisted investment in these new 
technologies.  As Oberling et al (2012) consider, small and technologically progressive firms 
are developing alternatives and could contribute in world of heterogeneous centres of liquid 
biofuel supply and consumption. However, in their attempt to reach the market with their 
products, their acquisition by oil majors suggests that their ability to co-exist with or take 
alternatives paths to those of the energy majors is unlikel\  6KHOO¶V DEVRUSWLRQ RI
biotechnology firms Codexis and Iogen Energy is a case in point.  Shell, like other oil majors 
such as BP, Exxon and Petrobras has been concerned with peak oil and, while maintaining 
access to conventional oil reserves remains a priority, it has diversified its sourcing of energy. 
By 2012, 12% of its reserves came from non-conventional oil (e.g. tar sands, deep water 
deposits) and it has been investigating low carbon alternatives in line with export market 
demand.  It pulled out of algae testing in Hawaii in 2011, citing poor return on investment, 
and decided to concentrate on a cellulosic ethanol project in Manitoba, Canada.  It invested in 
the biotechnology company Iogen Energy and its  VKDUH ZDV µaimed at significantly 
reducing the capital and operating costs per gallon of cellulosic ethanol. After Iogen Energy 
consulted on its economic strategy with Goldman Sachs Group Inc. the plant was closed in 
Manitoba, eliminating 150 jobs and Iogen sold off its industrial enzyme business, 
BioProducts, to pay off debts.                                                                                                                              
 The entire project was moved to Brazil where Shell also contributed its shares in 
Codexis and Iogen Energy WR WKHSDUWQHUV¶YHQWXUHZLWK%UD]LOLDQOHDGLQJVXJDUand ethanol 
producer, Cosan, With the $12 billion joint venture this new company, Raízen, produces 2.2 
billion litres of ethanol 4 million tons of sugar annually from 24 mills/distilleries and has an 
installed capacity of 900 MW of electric energy derived from sugar cane bagasse, giving it a 
23% market share. The company has over 4,500 service stations for retail fuel distribution in 
Brazil, 700 convenience stores, 53 fuel distribution depots, and aviation fuel businesses in 54 
airports in Brazil.  Its first step toward the commercialization of cellulosic biofuels technology 
in Brazil will cover development and engineering costs associated with the front end design of 
a biomass-to-ethanol facility to be co-ORFDWHGZLWK5Dt]HQ¶V&RVWD Pinto facility in Piracicaba, 
São Paulo. 
 
Biofuel financialisation and the spatial fix 
Creative destruction is embedded within the circulation of capital itself. Innovation 
exacerbates instability, insecurity, and in the end, becomes the prime force pushing 
capitalism into periodic paroxysms of crisis. [...] The struggle to maintain profitability 
sends capitalists racing off to explore all kinds of other possibilities.(HARVEY, 1989, 
p. 105-106).  
Cosan, a public listed company, had in 2008 signaled its faith in biofuels by using 
government credit to purchase the Exxon/Esso fuel distribution network.  Its swift purchase of 
the NovAmérica distilleries of Benálcool, Tarumã, Paraguaçu Paulista and Maracaí (and its 
Union brand of sugar) in the region of study the following year increased its number of plants 
to 24 and raised its annual processing capacity from 44 to 60 million tonnes of raw sugarcane, 
producing 4.2 million tonnes of sugar, 2 billion litres of ethanol and 900 MW of electricity 
(Cosan 2010).  Like many large sugar/ethanol companies, NovAmérica had speculated on the 
financial markets to feed its own expansion, which included a planned US$500 million 
plantation and distillery development in the frontier state of Mato Grosso do Sul.  With the 
WLJKWHQLQJRIJRYHUQPHQWFUHGLWDIWHUWKHµFUHGLWFUXQFK¶RILWIHOOafoul of the financial 
crash and debts of R$723.13 million surfaced. 
  &RVDQ¶V WDNHRYHU RI the NovAmérica distilleries represented a significant 
reorganization and specialization of production in the region and beyond.  Cosan chose to take 
over only the industrial complexes, preferring to leave the agricultural section in the hands of 
NovAmérica. The latter had introduced harvesting machines to the region in the 1990s, 
availing of the government Modefrota programme that helped to increase the number of 
machines in Brazilian agriculture from 28.2 million in 1999 to 44 million in 2001.  Its 
economies of scale and a state law for imminent total mechanisation of planting and 
harvesting have given it competitive advantage in the supply of raw sugar cane and it now 
supplies 8.5 million tonnes of sugarcane from over 100,000 hectares to Cosan plants in 
Tarumá, Maracaí, Paraguaçu and Caarapó.  Significantly, Cosan has forbidden NovAmérica 
from constructing a competing distillery within 100km oIDQ\RI&RVDQ¶Vunits.  In doing so 
Cosan shored up its competitive advantage in the industrial production of sugar and ethanol 
and pushes the responsibility for the supply of a high quality and quantity of sugar onto the 
contracted providers.  It also avoids direct responsibility for the labour involved in planting, 
harvesting and transporting raw sugarcane, seeking to avoid further charges of slave like 
labour that it faced in 2009. By 2012 of the 43 member companies of the Brazilian Sugarcane 
Industry Association (União da Indústria de Cana-de-Açúcar ± UNICA) that produce 60% of 
WKHFRXQWU\¶VHWKDQROLQ&RVDQDQG&RSHUVXFDU FRPPDQGHGSHUFHQWRIWKHFRXQWU\¶V
production.  Nonetheless the mechanisation and automation of agricultural and industrial 
processes and increasing land rents not only phased out smaller competitors such as the 
neighbouring SODQW RI 3DX G¶$OKR EXW DOVR HVFDODWHG debts for this conglomerate. In its 
merger with Shell, debts of some US$2.5 billion were transferred along with its assets of 
almost US$5 billion and debts of into this new company, Raizen.  
,Q5DL]HQ¶V0DUDFDL SODQWZDV WKH ILUVW LQ WKHZRUOG WRREWDLQ WKH%HWWHUVXJDU
certification for biofuel export as the joint venture began to deliver on its promise to µturn 
ethanol into an international commodity.  However, the trajectory of the above companies 
depict the inherent instability that characterises the industry.  By 2002 Sao Paulo was 
managing a cultivation cost of sugar cane of US$150/tonne compared to US$300/tonne in the 
Northeast and US$450/t for US maize based bioethanol.  Technological advances and 
development of new strains of sugar cane meant that cultivation of raw sugar cane per hectare 
increased from 50 tonnes to 80 tonnes.  But these productivity gains have done little to curb a 
seemingly insatiable appetite for land.  The continued need to borrow in order to invest, 
maintain plantation and distilleries and rejuvenate plantations every five years means that 
consultants predict that a further foreign investment of R$44 billion is required for its 
predicted expansion of 3.1 million hectares in sugarcane at a time when large quantities of 
liquid cash is returning to North America and Europe.  While the revenue from the sector in 
the Central South region was US$60 billion this year, debts in the sector are around US$56 
billion for the 2013/2014 season.  A further 60 plants are estimated to close within five years 
in Sao Paulo state. Eighteen thousand jobs were lost last year alone.  :KHQ 3DX '¶DOKR
closed, around 1,000 of the dispensed workers came from Ibirarema, a town of only 7,200 
people. As the mayor declared a state of emergency workers faced the prospect of 
unemployment they could ill afford.  Stories of unpaid wages are emerging across the state as 
workers in small towns these energy firms target for labour look into a very uncertain future.  
 
Power geometries and rural labour  
 µ7KHSRRUZLOOQHYHUEX\ODQGDJDLQ¶ 
Luis, Brazil Landless Workers Movement, Assis, 2013. 
The landless 
Biofuel production has been accompanied by a popular institutional discourse that perennial 
crops for biofuels would regenerate marginal land, and an often cited aspiration that small 
farmers would be the guardians of this cultivation (ILO and UNEP, 2012).  It is apparent, 
however, that the best land has been appropriated by expanding companies while 
technological advances in soil treatment and new public-private partnerships are extending 
production into more fragile a savannah terrain. It is also increasingly evident that small 
landholding, familial farming cannot compete with the industrial scale cultivation, milling and 
distillation. Brazilian land prices rose on average by 12% between 2006 and 2007, with the 
sharpest increases recorded where sugarcane expansion was most intense, as much as 17% in 
south east of the country and subsequently as much as 33% in frontier regions of Goias, 
where British Petroleum and Louis Dreyfus located.  Furthermore, Shell had only just 
completed its joint venture with Cosan when government credit was frozen as a response to 
its illegal sourcing sugar cane from ancestral, indigenous lands in Mato Grosso do Sul 
(ReporterBrasil).  While the Workers Party government have pointed to a modest reduction in 
social inequality, the indices of land concentration, the highest in the world, have not budged 
as corporate multinational strategies replace the huge landholdings of the former latifundios.  
The three latest censuses of 1985, 1995 and 2006 show that the Gini Coefficient, used to 
measure the distribution of land use, has been practically unchanged, expressed by 0.857, in 
1995/96, and 0.856, in 2006 (an index of 1.0 would mean all the land was owned by one 
person). 
Joao (aged 57) spoke after a meeting of the Brazil Landless :RUNHUV¶ Movement 
(MST) beside the rail track leading out of Assis. He puffed on a cigarette rolled from a maize 
leaf and recalled the days when opportunities for agricultural work were more abundant and 
varied, and when the terra roche, the rich, red soil of this river basin had provided incomes 
from maize and cattle, coffee and cotton. Life had not been easy, but the seven seasons he and 
his wife had spent cutting sugar cane in Maracai and Trauma were just part of various jobs 
WKDWKDG VXVWDLQHG WKHPDQGPDQ\ UHODWLYHV ³0\ OLIHKDVEHHQ OLNH WKDW´ KH VWDWHG ³JRLQJ
from cattle to coffee, sugar, here, there, around Assis, a few seasons in Parana, before the 
VXJDUFDQH WRRN RYHU´ +LV ZLIH (OHQD KDG EHHQ WKH ILUVW WR EH GLVPLVVHG IURP WKH ILHOGV DV
women were relegated to planting and then collecting the cane that had fallen from trucks, 
then the older workers like Joao started to be replaced by younger workers. 
Checking that an elderly member of the camp who had taken a stroke a few nights 
previous is taking the correct medication, Elena, one of WKHFDPS¶VFR-ordinators spoke softly 
and firmly,  
In the SHULSKHU\>RIWKHFLW\@LWLVQ¶WVDIHWKHXQHPSOR\PHQWWKHGUXJVDUHDSUREOHP
LW¶VGDQJHURXVSHRSOHZLWKKXQJHUJRLQJKXQJU\LW¶VDUHDOSUREOHP7KDW¶VZK\ZH
fight for the land. We have a right to it, we know how to work it, grow our own food. 
We fight for this. But no one wants to help (Interview, June 2012). 
They demanded seven hectares of land each; the minimum for family survival. But so far the 
government institution for agrarian reform, INCRA, had offered nothing. They had been 
given ten days to leave their occupation by the courts and police, after objections from ALL, 
the transport logistics company (Cosan have a 10% share in the firm) who own the adjacent 
rail tracks. The children were lifted from the tracks when an oncoming cargo train of soya 
charged by. Fourteen months later the camp dwellers, faced with little prospect of gaining 
increasingly expensive land in this area of Sao Paulo, disbanded. Eight families had travelled 
to join a larger camp in Marabá in Pontal de Paranapanema to which they had been invited by 
the movement, but by Christmas 2013 there had been no progress with the authorities. A co-
ordinator who had been among them returned to Assis. His grandfather had worked with 
cattle, as had he for a short time in Parana. He had sought to get some land so he could bring 
his children back and live with him there. He arrived to talk to us by bicycle as he had no 
longer the money to fuel his car. His partner was seeking cleaning work in the town and he 
was hoping to pick up any kind of job he could. Many of the 80-100 families that had been 
involved in the occupation returned to the peripheries of the small rural towns. They included 
former sugar cane cutters from Paraguacu, Assis and Florinea that had been among the ranks 
of unemployed forming this land occupation, now trying to access the family assistance 
packages that many of those expelled from the closed distilleries were also relying on across 
the region.   
The assassination of Cicero Guedes, a cane cutter and leading member of the landless 
workers movement in Rio de Janeiro, 2013 brought to 1 650 the number of rural and 
indigenous workers killed in land-related conflicts since 1985 and was a stark reminder that 
land is still keenly contested in Brazil. Yet a convergence of state and agribusiness interests 
have all but frozen agrarian reform. Only President Fernado de Mello in his short presidency 
(1990-1992) redistributed less land than President Dilma Rouseff (86 properties by 2013).  In 
2013 the President announced a further R$115 billion for corporate agriculture as part of the 
agricultural plan. Less than 16% of this was set aside for family farming.  Furthermore, the 
westward expansion of the industrialised, agricultural model of biofuel extraction cannot be 
disassociated from indigenous dispossession and oppression.  While the government states 
that it had demarcated more indigenous land that any other Latin American country, 95% of 
this has been in remote regions of the Amazon.  In stark contrast, a 2012 eviction order was 
given to the Guarani-Kaiowa people occupying ancestral lands in the state of Mato Gross do 
Sul, among the fastest expanding frontiers for bioenergy cultivation.  The following year 34 
indigenous people were killed, the most of these in Mato Grosso so Sul, where precarious 
roadside occupations continue in the pursuit of land reclamation which has involved 30 
separate action by this group in 2013 alone (CPT, 2014). The concentration of land and 
employment opportunities in poor, rural areas, along with the increasing inability to reproduce 
familial agriculture weighs heavily on the shoulders of remaining poorly paid rural workers in 
the sugar and ethanol commodity chain to whom we now turn. 
 
Rural workers and their collective organisations 
On the same morning that an old, yellow, rural bus carried workers to the Raizen distillery at 
Taruma, two engineers were flying out to Canada to perfect advanced biotechnologies.  
Whereas as 2300 cane cutters from the periphery of Assis town stepped out of similar buses in 
2000, last season (2012-2013) saw only 230.  A union organiser within the distilleries of 
Raizen Taruma and Raizen Maracai, recalled joining workers who went on strike across the 
divisions of labour in 1989 and 1990µ:HGLGQ¶WNQRZDQ\WKLQJDERXWXQLRQVEXWZHKDGKDG
HQRXJK¶ :KHQVhe began her work in the sugar and ethanol industry, the town of Maracai 
had around 13000 inhabitants.    By 2011 its distillery that Raizen assumed in 2010 was 
receiving 1.7 million tons of cane sugar, producing 130 million tons of sugar and 63 million 
OLWUHV RI HWKDQRO DQG EHFDPH WKH ZRUOG¶V ILUVW PLOO WR UHFHLYH WKH µBetter Sugar Initiative¶
certification for export. This UK based certificate, subsequently endorsed by the European 
Union provides a guarantee of quality standards on environmental and, to a lesser extent, 
social grounds. In recent presentation to the International Energy Agency, Raizen pointed to 
the environmental and social record of the plant and emphasised the development 
opportunities the company brings to rural areas (IEA, 2011). Sugar production began to 
dominate agriculture in the area ever since NovAmerica took over the distillery in 1957. Soya 
cultivation had also arrived. Today the population has fallen by around 5,000 to 13,000 
inhabitants. According to those involved in the industry over the last three decades, two 
factors oversaw this exodus; firstly, monoculture replaced the more diverse and small farming 
agriculture on which the town had been built; secondly, machines began to replace the manual 
workers in the fields of soya and sugar and automation within the factories negated further job 
creation.  In the 2006-2007 harvest, only 18.6 % of the sugarcane in Brazil was mechanized. 
In 2008-2010 the figure rose to 45.3%. By 2015 harvest mechanisation in Sao Paulo state may 
be complete, ending jobs in their tens of thousands. Raizen, despite its global expansion, 
directly employed around 5,000 less workers across its 24 plants in 2013 than it did in 2012.  
 As Mandel (1980) states, capital uses a blend of hard (e.g. machines) and soft (e.g. 
lean organisation) technical innovations to overcome labour resistance, while relying on soft 
(e.g. welfare policy) or hard (e.g. violent repression) state intervention to avoid tensions 
spilling over into overt social conflict (see also Jessop, 2014).  A range of strategies have, and 
continue to be employed across the sector to keep labour and social tension in check. 
0HFKDQLVDWLRQ KDV EHHQ µGLVDSSHDULQJ¶ WKH SUREOHP RI KLVWRULF VODYH OLNH ODERXU RQ VXJDU
plantations in selected sites of production subject to greater public scrutiny. It has also 
dovetailed with continued breaches of labour law and illegal dismissals of strike leaders by 
smaller and multinational corporations to intensify manual production (Garvey and Barreto, 
2014) and ensure that increase in corporate power has, in the eyes of sugar cane cutters, come 
at the expense of their collective power.  As Marcio at the Cocal plant recalled,  
³We struck before, various times.  Sometimes you would get something, other times 
nothing.  But now they have built Cocal II [in neighbouring Pontal of Paranapanema], 
VR\RXNQRZ>KHVKDNHVKLVKHDG@WKH\¶UH powerful´. 
A fellow worker employed in a nearby plantation stated that in relation to taking strike action, 
³:LWKPHcKDQLVDWLRQQRZ LW¶VKDUGHU WKH\VD\ WKH\ MXVWGRQ¶WQHHG \RX´7KHGLVPLVVDORI
strike leaders in several plants following several large, but uncoordinated strikes of 2008 was 
a cursory reminder that internationalisation of biofuel does not necessarily mean job security 
for low paid workers in the emerging commodity chains. Instructively, Chan et al (2013) 
demonstrate how recent state promotion of employment and industrial growth in China can 
ERWK SURJUHVV µSUR-ODERXU OHJDO UHIRUPV¶ ZKLOH OLPLWLQJ RIWHQ VHYHUHO\ ZRUNHU VHOI-
organisation.. In Brazil, trade unions alongside notable actions from the Ministry of Labour 
have recognised that the increased international visibility of export orientated companies 
provided a significant leverage to reduce, for example, the outsourcing of manual cane 
cutting.  Corporate claims of social responsibility, however, seek to concentrate attention (and 
certification) on work security and quality in the µFHQWUDO¶ RU µSULPDU\ DFWLYLWLHV¶RI OHDGLQJ
firms, in which Brazilian law forbids (as distinct from prevents) outsourcing, even as they 
continuously challenge, or breach the law. Leading biofuel companies are clients of one of the 
three business management companies that have innovated the digitised quality control 
systems that dominate the industry, TOTVs (38 % market share), SAP of Germany (28 % 
market share) and US company Oracle (16 % market share). These have helped 
SURIHVVLRQDOLVH PDQDJHPHQW DQG µOHDQ¶ RUJDQLVDWLRQ SUDFWLFHV LQ ZKLFK performance based 
pay and bonuses seek to encourage workers to view their own interests as those of 
management. To this end they have had some success and have convinced many industrial 
trade unions and indeed the International Labour Organisation of the merits of their 
endeavours towards sustainable development and decent work for new, albeit fewer, skilled 
jobs within the modernising plants.  Meanwhile outsourcing of harvesting, loading and 
transport continues, with contracts often struck outside of public and trade union regulation, 
FUHDWLQJVRPHRI%UD]LO¶VPRVWKD]DUGRXVZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQV (Garvey and Barreto, 2014).   
 In sum, while modest social reforms such as minimum wage increases and negotiated 
collective agreements are improving conditions in specific sites of production, massive rural 
labour exclusion and factory closures are undoing the hard fought, self-determined gains won 
by rural workers in 1980s, while basic wages remain stubbornly well below those required for 
a living wage.  As the General Secretary for the Sao Paulo Federation of Workers in Food 
Industry of workers in food pointed out,  
These multinational cause us great problems. Automation continues to replace workers 
within the plants, perhaps by around 10% per year. For while that was offset by 
industrial expansion. But with factory closures, over 40 recently, think about it. 
Perhaps 200 staff in each. When it comes to negotiating, as we expect to do this May 
(2014), it puts us in a very difficult position (Interview, March 2014).  
Whereas before the São Paulo Federation of Workers in the Chemical and Pharmaceutical 
Industries (which represents workers in the ethanol refining distilleries and laboratories), 
previously negotiated with industry association, UNICA, now it must also negotiate with the 
multinationals as one corporation operating across, for example, Sao Paulo, Mato Grosso, 
Mato Gross do Sul and Goias is now too powerful to represented by the official governance 
body (Interview, March 2014).   
Hence the geographical flexibility of employers and workers is asymmetrical, a factor 
which characterizes the emergent labour relations regime in the region.  The current logic of 
accelerated territorial expansion, streamlined organizational capacity and market 
concentration across state, regional, national and international boundaries that typifies the 
successful sugar and ethanol corporations contrasts starkly with the relatively fixed nature of 
the rural trade unions, whose geographical and occupational limits to organizing are enshrined 
in current Brazilian labour law that dates to the 1940s.  The President of Federação dos 
Trabalhadores na Agricultura do Estado de São Paulo (FERAESP), Elio Neves, put it 
succinctly:  
In Brazil we have trade unions, but we do not have a trade union movement.  Those 
are two different things.  A movement means the collective good, recognizing the 
struggle of other workers.  Here in São Paulo, that area where you have been, you 
have workers from Paraguaçu, Maracaí, Tarumá, Florínea, Assis, small towns in 
3RQWDO <RX¶YHPD\EHWHQUXUDOWUDGHXQLRQVLQWKDWDUHDUHSUHVHQWLQJWKRVHZRUNHUV
but you have one company Raizen with 24 distilleries, or two maybe ±with Cocal ± 
exploiting all of them! 
Discussions on labour reform ground to halt within the Lula administration in 2007. Within 
the enduring FRUSRUDWHWUDGHXQLRQVWUXFWXUHLQKHULWHGIURP0XVVROLQL¶V,WDO\VHH*RPHVDQG
Prado 2011) a trade union must limit its activities to a defined geographical boundary and the 
specific occupation of worker that it represents. The result is that the unions are spatially 
limited and that cane cutters, drivers, and machine operators in factories refining sugar 
primarily for food and those refining it for ethanol distilleries may all belong to different 
unions who appear to be more content with co-existence than co-operation.  Many of the rural 
unions prefer cooperation to conflict and prefer their autonomy to alliance with either of the 
two federations in the state of São Paulo: the traditionally more conservative Federação dos 
Trabalhadores na Agricultura do Estado de São Paulo linked to the Confederação Nacional 
dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura (CONTAG ± National Confederation of Agricultural 
Workers); and FERAESP, borne out of the militant actions of the cane cutters in the 1980s 
and linked to CUT.   
 
Conclusion 
The elements of state, corporate and labour strategies outlined above help to illustrate that 
technological innovation occurs neither in a vacuum or pristine environment but is part of a 
hegemonic process whose inception and application carries the mark of the socially and 
economically powerful. Innovation requires credit in abundance and hence corporations align 
technological innovation with nation state transnational policy while their financialisation is 
increasingly linked to risk-adverse shareholders. By extending an analysis of techno-
institutional complexes to consider the internal power relations and those systemic social 
relations within which these are embedded, we have sought to demonstrate that these are 
unstable contested couplings. Furthermore, as primary commodity production illustrates 
dramatically, the gaining and maintaining of competitive technological and market advantage 
relies on an ability to reconfigure space for often ephemeral wealth creation (Santos, 1978).   
Consequent concerns over the replacement of food crops with energy crops and indirect land 
use change have incentivised innovation in secondary or advanced biofuels as a less harmful 
alternative. These can, theoretically, be derived from any starchy, woody species, including 
the cellulosic waste from existing sugar/ethanol production and have been promoted and 
accepted as a solution at levels of transnational governance. A more systemic analysis of the 
emerging biofuel commodity chain, as we have attempted to do at least in part here, would 
suggest that these assumptions of a µEHWWHU DOWHUQDWLYH¶ underestimate how and why 
corporations must expand territorial control, commodify additional natural resources and 
diversify energy sources and markets to secure profit margins.  Recent history shows that 
innovative technologies that open new frontiers for accumulation (drilling in deep sea, 
improving poor soils, breaking cellular walls) continue in tandem with existing, path 
dependent, techno-institutional systems.  As is demonstrated by the testimonies and 
frustrations of rural workers here, these corporate strategies continue to rely on state support 
to guarantee investment and reassure foreign markets, open new spaces, suppress the 
discontented (by maintaining archaic labour law, stalling land redistribution; evicting 
indigenous populations).  Hence accumulation that depends on the overlap of techno-
institutional and spatial fixes requires in turn continued dispossession of competing actors 
over space and time. The geographical flexibility and mobility of agroenergy leaders relies on 
the political, economic and spatial limits bestowed on rural populations.  
A failed occupation of the MST is more typical of recent occupations in the region 
than the relative successes of the 1990s. Indigenous populations figure each time more 
prominently in conflicts over land, water and energy (CPT, 2013).  While some rural unions 
have been challenging the biofuel companies with measured success and the leadership of 
FERAESP has been energetic on broader questions of agrarian reform, outsourcing and 
migrant worker rights, they are compromised by their own geographic isolation and the 
acquiescence or compliance of other rural and industrial based trade unions.  Across this 
emerging commodity chain the paper provides snap shots in time: family assistance packages 
are sought after by the newly unemployed and dispossessed as institutional leaders meet on 
international platforms promoting bioenergy trade; logistics companies transporting sugar and 
soya use the courts to remove the landless, their tents, old cars and their bicycles from beside 
the rail tracks; eleven former sugar cane cutters play cards near a disused rural bus that they 
once frequented, while engineers fly privately to Canadian laboratories; indigenous families 
are camped alongside a road peddled by trucks racing to the eastern port at Santos. These 
images, gleaned from the accounts of rural workers in an expanding region of biofuel 
production, provide a stark depiction of the power asymmetries and geometries strewn across 
these spaces of biofuel production, of the inequality being reproduced within a key pillar of 
the green economy, of the pouring of old wine into new glasses.   
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